Abstract. Autonomous systems operating in the vicinity of humans are critical in that they potentially harm humans. As the complexity of autonomous system software makes the zero-fault objective hardly attainable, we adopt a fault-tolerance approach. We consider a separate safety channel, called a monitor, that is able to partially observe the system and to trigger safety-ensuring actuations. A systematic process for specifying a safety monitor is presented. Hazards are formally modeled, based on a risk analysis of the monitored system. A model-checker is used to synthesize monitor behavior rules that ensure the safety of the monitored system. Potentially excessive limitation of system functionality due to presence of the safety monitor is addressed through the notion of permissiveness. Tools have been developed to assist the process.
Introduction
Autonomous systems such as robots and unmanned vehicles are widely studied and technically feasible. An important bottleneck for their effective deployment in human environments is the safety concerns of both users and certification authorities. Various ad-hoc safety measures have been designed, often focused on particular risks, such as collision. However, if autonomous systems are to be certified, the method needs to be generalized. We propose here a general method to build high-level safety specifications based on hazard analysis.
The autonomous systems of interest to us offer a wide range of features and operate in a diverse unstructured environment. They can thus be complex, which makes them difficult to verify. Moreover, diversity of the environment implies that testing cannot significantly cover the situations that the system will face. Here, we choose a classical fault tolerance approach by considering online safety measures implemented in a device called a safety monitor, that is simple and independent from the main control channel, and thus easier to verify. The monitor is solely responsible for safe system behavior. To this end, the monitor is equipped with means for context observation (i.e., sensors) and is able to trigger safety interventions. The monitor behavior is specified declaratively by a set of safety rules, each defining one intervention to apply in certain observation conditions. However, safety interventions may also prevent the system from fulfilling its functions. For instance, a vehicle whose emergency brakes are permanently engaged is useless. We require the monitor to be permissive with respect to the possibility for the system to perform useful tasks.
Continuing the work of Mekki-Mokhtar et al.
[1], we propose a process based on hazard analysis to specify safety monitors and extend it by means of formal methods. Once a hazard is identified, it is necessary to specify what the monitor has to do to avoid it, i.e., the safety rules. We aim to explore solutions very early in the autonomous system design process. Thus, many observations and interventions can be considered in a first design iteration, whereas only the most appropriate ones are actually developed and implemented. We propose to use model-checking to explore and check the specifications.
The main contributions of this paper are: -A method to explore possible safety specifications by using model-checking.
-A method for modeling permissiveness in temporal logic.
-A set of tools to support the methodology 1 . First, we present the overall concepts and process in Section 2. Section 3 details the exploration of possible safety rules in a discrete model, which is applied in Section 4 to a mobile manufacturing robot. Related work is discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 presents conclusions and future work.
Baseline and Concepts
We introduce here the underlying concepts of our work, based on definitions adapted from [1] , and then present the overall process.
Concepts
Taking inspiration from the IEC 61508 standard [2], we define a safety monitor as a device responsible for safety, in opposition to the main control channel which is responsible for all other functional and non-functional requirements of the system. The monitor is equipped with means for context observation (i.e., sensors) and able to trigger safety interventions. The safety monitor is independent from the main control channel, as regards its means of observation, computation and intervention. It is required to protect against all faults that adversely affect safety, including interaction faults. The whole safety channel is assumed fault-free (for example, we consider that the sensors available to the monitor are perfect, without uncertainty.) In practice, this must be achieved through classical redundancy and verification techniques. We focus in our work on the upstream task of obtaining a correct high-level specification with respect to safety and permissiveness.
